Interest Rate and Cap Rate Cycles

Source: Marcus & Millichap Stronger Hiring and Rising Inflation Could Shape CRE reinforces the cycle framework's variable-separation rule: the public page treats hiring, inflation, rate expectations, CRE pricing, and transaction implications as connected topics, not interchangeable inputs. Because the video transcript is gated, use it only to structure scenario review and rely on primary labor, inflation, Treasury, pricing, and transaction evidence for numeric assumptions.

Cap rates do not mechanically track interest rates, but they are never independent of them for long. The useful underwriting question is not "Will rates go up or down?" It is "How will the current rate regime change debt sizing, buyer yield requirements, transaction volume, and exit pricing for this asset type?"

Core Mechanism

As a conceptual decomposition, rather than an accounting identity or a pricing formula:

$$\text{Cap Rate} = \text{Risk-Free Rate} + \text{Required Spread} - \text{Expected NOI Growth}$$

The subtraction is a scenario framework, not an unconditional extraction of growth or a Treasury-to-cap pass-through. Cap Rate Decomposition defines when an r−g cash capitalization relation holds, including matched cash/NOI, forward/trailing timing and convergence. Keep short-lived lease-up effects in dated cash flows.

Three variables do most of the work:

• The long end of the curve drives permanent-loan pricing and investor opportunity cost.
• Required spread expands in periods of fear and compresses when capital is abundant.
• Expected NOI growth can partially offset higher base rates, but only when the growth case is credible.

This is why two assets can face the same Treasury environment and price very differently. A trophy industrial asset with mark-to-market rent upside can sustain a tighter spread than a commodity office asset with rollover risk.

What Usually Happens in a Rate Cycle

1. Tightening

• Policy rates rise.
• Sellers anchor to yesterday's pricing.
• Buyers re-underwrite to higher debt costs.
• Transaction volume drops before cap rates fully adjust.

2. Plateau / Price Discovery

• Policy tightening pauses or slows.
• Appraisals and lender expectations catch up.
• Cap rates widen to a new clearing range.
• Distress and recapitalization opportunities start to surface.

3. Early Easing

• Policy rates move lower.
• Bid-ask spreads narrow.
• Transaction volume returns before broad cap-rate compression fully shows up.
• The biggest beneficiaries are assets that already cash flow and can refinance into a better debt stack.

4. Easy-Money Compression

• Financing is widely available.
• Buyers stretch on exit pricing.
• Negative leverage becomes more common.
• Future growth assumptions begin doing too much of the underwriting work.

The mistake is to treat every easing phase as an automatic "buy everything" signal. Some cycles only improve financing conditions for already-good assets while leaving weaker assets stranded.

The Most Important Distinction: Policy Rate vs. Long-End Rate

Commercial real estate cares about the Fed, but it prices off the full curve.

• The policy rate matters for floating-rate debt, bridge loans, and rate-cap costs.
• The 10-year Treasury and swaps matter more for permanent debt and exit-cap logic.

The September 2026 increase changes the current policy direction while the long end also remains expensive. The relative level versus an earlier peak does not establish easing today. A change in overnight rates does not mechanically set cap rates or permanent-loan coupons.

The May 2026 podcast synthesis reinforces this as a practitioner confusion point. Episodes on fixed versus floating debt, DSCR risk, macro volatility, inflation cooling, and CRE debt-market outlook repeatedly mix Fed expectations, SOFR exposure, Treasury-market volatility, and cap-rate sentiment. The canonical rule remains: use podcast notes to identify which rate variables practitioners are discussing, then verify policy-rate, SOFR, swap, Treasury, and cap-rate inputs from dated primary or broker-research sources before modeling.

Green Street's May and June 2026 CPPI notes give a compact current example of the same rule. The May 6 note reported that the all-property index decreased 0.1% in April, life science values declined, other sectors were unchanged, and a 10-year Treasury in the mid-4% range was still limiting buyer enthusiasm. The June 4 note then reported positive all-property pricing momentum, but its forward-looking caution still pointed to higher Treasury yields as a headwind. That means the cap-rate-cycle read should allow selective NOI-driven appreciation while still resisting broad exit-cap compression unless the long-end rate, lender-spread, and buyer-depth evidence supports it. See Source: Green Street CPPI Commercial Property Prods Along May 2026 and Source: Green Street CPPI Property Prices Up 4 Percent Over Past Year June 2026.

Green Street's August 6, 2026 CPPI update reports a 1.0% July increase and 5.2% trailing-year gain in U.S. all-property values. Green Street attributes 2–3% of that annual gain to rental-income growth and the balance to lower cap rates. Treat this as a quality-weighted valuation signal that strengthens the price-discovery case while still requiring local transactions, current debt terms, and asset-level NOI before lowering exit-cap or refinancing stress assumptions. See Source: Green Street CPPI Values Increase 5 Percent August 2026.

Source: Green Street CPPI Pricing Expected to Stay in a Tight Range supplies the July sequel: the all-property index was unchanged in June despite a 4.1% trailing-year increase, while Green Street attributed modest gains to sticky cap rates and high interest rates. Use this as a time-sensitive pricing-index signal and scenario constraint: a positive trailing-year print can coexist with flat monthly pricing and does not justify mechanically lowering exit caps.

Source: Green Street Commercial Property Price Index February 2026 provides the earlier range-bound baseline: January pricing was flat and the all-property index was up 2.4% year over year, but still 15.9% below the 2022 peak. Sector dispersion was material, with office 35% below its peak while strip retail, data centers, and health care posted 5% twelve-month gains. Use the CPPI as a quality-weighted pricing cross-check, not as permission to compress exit caps without rate, NOI, lender, and buyer-depth evidence.

Source: Green Street CPPI Fair Pricing Equals Stable Prices adds the February checkpoint: pricing rose 0.2% month over month and 2.5% year over year, while Green Street said cap rates should stay steady until the 10-year Treasury leaves its recent range. The underwriting implication is synchronization risk: a small positive CPPI print does not override rate-lock, debt-service, refinance, or exit-cap stress cases.

Source: Green Street CPPI Elevated Treasury Yields April 2026 adds the March signal: pricing rose 0.4% month over month and 2.6% year over year, but Green Street said renewed Treasury pressure made further near-term price gains unlikely. Preserve the date and source-family caveat; current yield curves and financing evidence must supersede this event-specific commentary.

Source: MSCI Real Assets 4.5 Percent Treasury Threshold June 2026 adds the rate-change-speed qualifier. MSCI says the relevant 2024 friction was the speed at which rates moved, leaving appraisal marks and loan pricing behind credit markets; in June 2026 it reported the RCA CPPI all-property index up 1.1% year over year as of April. That is a conditional price-discovery signal, not an exit-cap input: a fast new rate shock can still reopen rate-lock, coverage, and buyer-depth risk even if the Treasury level itself is historically familiar.

CBRE's Canada Q1 2026 cap-rate page gives the same mechanism in a Canadian bond-market context: despite sharp intra-quarter bond-yield volatility, the Canada 10-year finished effectively flat quarter-over-quarter, leaving the national all-property cap rate down 2 bps to 6.61% and the spread at 317 bps (market_observations.id=28596-28598). Treat that as evidence of selective spread discipline, not automatic broad compression. See Source: CBRE Canadian Cap Rates and Investment Insights Q1 2026.

Source: CBRE Canadian Cap Rates and Investment Insights Q2 2026 provides the next-quarter check: the all-properties cap rate reached 6.58% after a 3 bps decline, while the Canada 10-year spread widened slightly to 320 bps and CBRE described that spread as still in flux. The sequence reinforces the policy rule: modest cap-rate movement can coexist with volatile long-end funding costs, so exit-cap and refinance cases need scenario ranges rather than mechanical rate-to-yield compression.

Source: CBRE Q2 2026 U.S. Capital Markets Report adds a U.S. lender-execution check: within CBRE Capital Markets' fixed-rate permanent-loan closings, average commercial LTV was 59.6%, DSCR 1.43x, debt yield 10.2%, mortgage interest rate 5.7%, and cap rate 6.3%. CBRE says spreads narrowed while LTV tightened, so lender competition was expressed through price rather than leverage. Treat the source universe as a current execution comparator, not a target debt structure or proof that a specific exit cap will clear.

Source: Cushman & Wakefield Treasury Volatility Lenders July 2026 adds a July rate-shock check. Its observed market commentary says 5- and 10-year Treasuries were 55–80 bps above February troughs, while commercial-bank CRE portfolios still grew $1.9B per week from March through June and CMBS issuance remained active. The relevant cycle lesson is not that higher long rates are harmless: tight spreads and a lower SOFR base can preserve financeability for assets with credible NOI growth, but higher Treasury rates can still change fixed-versus-floating economics and stall an asset whose debt service, rate cap, or exit case is thin.

Source: GlobeSt Higher Treasury Yields Are Testing CRE Pricing Without Breaking Cap Rates provides a limited publication-layer cross-check: its public description reports stable average cap rates but more divided investor expectations about future pricing. Because the underlying CBRE survey is not publicly exposed in the captured page, this supports scenario testing and diligence, not a numeric market conclusion.

Source: CoStar U.S. Commercial Property Prices Slip, Dragged Down by Offices adds a repeat-sale cycle check: May prices declined for both value-weighted and equal-weighted measures while the reported distressed share remained limited. Treat that as evidence of repricing without broad forced selling; do not translate it directly into exit-cap, debt-cost, or refinance assumptions.

Source: CBRE 2025 U.S. Real Estate Market Outlook Midyear Review gives the prior-year version of the same rule. CBRE's July 2025 outlook still expected the 10-year Treasury near 4.3% at year-end and said cap rates should begin easing from cyclical peaks, but it also warned that compression would likely be slower and more broadly visible in 2026. For underwriting, that makes 2025 midyear a price-discovery / income-return checkpoint, not a green light for immediate exit-cap tightening.

Source: Cushman & Wakefield AI, Bonds & CRE 2026 adds a 2026 duration-supply warning to this page's policy-rate versus long-end-rate distinction. C&W argues that AI-related corporate bond issuance, Treasury supply, and a Fed no longer absorbing duration through QE can keep long-duration capital expensive even if inflation moderates or the Fed cuts. Underwriting should therefore test refinance and exit-cap assumptions against base-rate persistence, not only quoted credit spreads or the Fed funds path.

Source: Marcus & Millichap Inflation and Interest Rate Outlook June 2026 adds the near-term repricing case: M&M's visible page says markets moved from expecting 2026 cuts to pricing a greater-than-50% probability of a rate increase by year-end, with the 5-year Treasury around 4.2% and the 10-year in the mid-4% range after late-February movement. For this page, the lesson is mechanical: do not treat improved space demand or capital availability as cap-rate compression unless the long end, rate-hike probability, and debt proceeds still clear the exit-cap and refinance tests.

Source: GlobeSt A More Opaque Fed Complicates the CRE Outlook 2026 adds a separate policy-visibility test. When Fed guidance is less explicit, the model should not simply choose a higher or lower rate path; it should widen the uncertainty range around refinance timing, buyer depth, floating-rate exposure, and exit caps. Sectors with real pricing power can still benefit from inflation, but that inflation hedge should be supported by property-level rent growth and tenant durability rather than by central-bank signaling.

Source: Matthews Next Fed Chair CRE 2026 adds the leadership-transition version of that visibility test. Matthews' useful point is procedural: the Fed chair can shape tone and market interpretation, but FOMC decisions and economic conditions still drive policy. For underwriting, treat a chair transition as a scenario-band and communication-risk input, not a reason to hard-code lower or higher exit caps. The same model should still key off Treasury yields, credit spreads, lender appetite, inflation, employment, maturities, and refinance proceeds.

How the Cycle Shows Up by Asset Class

2026 Regime Read

The Source: FRED/ALFRED DFII10 Vintage Actuals 2026-08-01 supplies a real-rate control alongside the nominal long-end rate: 2,895 daily first-print observations of the inflation-indexed 10-year Treasury yield from January 2015 through July 2026. A rising real yield can tighten the required-return backdrop even when nominal-rate movement is partly explained by changing inflation expectations, but it remains a macro control rather than a direct cap-rate or property-debt input.

The Source: FRED/ALFRED DGS10 Vintage Actuals 2026-08-01 supplies the nominal long-end rate used in the same stack: 2,895 daily first-print observations from January 2015 through July 2026. Compare its movement with DFII10 to distinguish nominal-rate repricing from real-rate pressure, then apply the result through actual lender spreads, debt constants, exit liquidity, and asset-level pricing evidence.

As of April 9, 2026:

• The Fed target range is 3.50% to 3.75%.
• The 10-year Treasury is around 4.29%.
• Inflation has moderated, but capital markets remain selective rather than easy.

That makes the current regime best described as late price-discovery / early easing, not full compression.

What follows from that:

• Cap-rate compression should be selective, not broad-based.
• Asset quality matters more than macro beta.
• Debt yield and DSCR remain more important than formal maximum LTV.
• Exit underwriting should not assume the market will forgive a weak going-in basis.

May 2026 Direct-Upload Rate-Cycle Read

The reviewed May 2026 direct-upload batch strengthens the existing rule that CRE should price off the long end of the curve, real-rate expectations, and credit spreads, not the Fed funds rate alone. Morgan Stanley's September 2025 REIT cheat sheet explicitly frames REIT sensitivity through real rates, variable-rate debt relief, dividend-yield demand, transaction-market support, and valuation multiples; the practical takeaway is that Fed cuts are a transmission channel, not a complete cap-rate thesis.

JPMorgan's May 1, 2026 macro notes were still a cautious base case: near-term U.S. data looked solid, but energy-shock risk reduced confidence in near-term easing unless labor-market or growth weakness became clearer. UBS's May 7, 2026 briefing expected two Fed cuts in 2H26 and stronger deal activity, but that belongs in the model as an attributed UBS forecast rather than a fact.

For underwriting, this means a lower policy-rate path can support transaction volume and refinance math, but it should not automatically tighten exit caps. A cap-rate compression case still needs asset-level NOI durability, credible buyer liquidity, and a financing-cost read that includes the 10-year, swaps, REIT debt yields, and lender spreads. See Source: JPM US Econ 5 1 26, Source: JPM US Weekly Prospects 5 1 26, Source: MS REIT Cheat Sheet Fed Cuts 9 4 25 REAL 20250904 1959, Source: UBS CEO20Briefing20 20202620SF, and Source Collection: May 2026 REIT and Capital Markets Research Batch.

Decision Rules for Underwriting

Use the debt constant, not just the note rate

Real leverage math depends on amortization and debt service, not a headline coupon. If the debt constant is above the going-in cap rate, the deal is in negative leverage even before reserves, TIs, and CapEx.

Treat cap compression as upside, not as the base case

In the current regime, the base case should usually be:

• flat exit cap
• or exit cap wider by 25-50 bps

Only underwrite tighter exits when there is a specific reason:

• proven submarket scarcity
• obvious basis discount to replacement cost
• high-probability lease-up into institutional debt

Separate refinancing risk from valuation risk

An asset can be correctly valued and still be difficult to refinance. The cycle now punishes assets whose income profile does not support a new loan at today's debt-service tests, even if the property remains strategically relevant.

Let the asset class set the spread discipline

The same Treasury level should not imply the same cap-rate move everywhere. Office, industrial, and multifamily each clear at different spreads because they carry different lease, operating, and lender-risk profiles.

Common Errors

• Using Fed cuts alone to justify lower exit caps
• Treating 2021 cap rates as a normal equilibrium instead of a late-cycle outlier
• Assuming all easing cycles restore transaction liquidity equally across asset classes
• Ignoring how rollover risk changes required spread even when Treasury rates are stable
• Modeling refinance proceeds off target LTV instead of the binding DSCR or debt-yield test

Related Pages

• CRE Market Cycle Phases — the supply-demand cycle framework that rate cycles transmit through
• Cap Rate Decomposition
• CRE Capital Stack and Debt Structuring
• CRE as an Inflation Hedge
• Tariff Trade Policy and Reshoring Impact
• Office Debt Markets 2026
• Distressed Asset Underwriting
• CRE Investment Strategy
• Source: Green Street CPPI Commercial Property Prods Along May 2026
• Source: Green Street CPPI Property Prices Up 4 Percent Over Past Year June 2026
• Source: Green Street CPPI Pricing Expected to Stay in a Tight Range
• Source: CBRE Canadian Cap Rates and Investment Insights Q1 2026
• Source: CBRE Canadian Cap Rates and Investment Insights Q2 2026
• Source: Matthews Next Fed Chair CRE 2026

March 2026 CPI Shock: Energy-Driven Inflation Spike

The BLS reported CPI rose 0.9% MoM in March 2026 (up from 0.3% in February), with energy costs surging ~11% in the period. Headline CPI reached 3.3% YoY, while core CPI remained more contained at 0.2% MoM / 2.6% YoY. The energy index climbed 12.5% YoY. This is a supply-shock inflation episode driven by energy, not demand-pull — an important distinction because underlying demand is not overheating.

The Fed was already contending with stalled progress toward its 2% target before this print. Policymakers have signaled that rate hikes "remain a possibility if inflation reaccelerates," and any easing would require signs of labor market weakness. Middle East geopolitical developments are an emerging risk factor through energy markets and supply chain disruptions.

Marcus & Millichap's June 2026 inflation brief adds the May follow-through: headline CPI rose 0.5% month over month after 0.6% in April and reached 4.2% year over year, but core CPI was only 0.2% month over month and 2.9% year over year. For cap-rate underwriting, that keeps the easing path conditional rather than broken: energy and freight shocks can delay compression, while contained core inflation reduces the case for near-term renewed hikes absent another shock. See Source: Marcus & Millichap Inflation Research Brief June 2026.

Source: Berkadia Labor Market Cools, but Inflation Remains the Bigger Problem provides the labor-side counterpart: a weak June payroll print can lower near-term hike expectations while above-target inflation and energy risks keep the broader rate path uncertain. Use it to widen the paused-easing scenario band, not to forecast a durable Treasury decline. Recheck floating-rate carry, refinance proceeds, debt yield, and exit caps separately; map employment softness to CRE only where local tenant demand and household income are exposed.

Marcus & Millichap's March 2026 Financial Markets brief captures the policy bind before that June inflation update. The applied rows preserve the 3.5% Fed Funds lower bound, one median 2026 Fed cut in the SEP, 2.7% Fed projections for PCE and core PCE inflation, a 3.1% January core PCE reading, and a 4.39% 10-year Treasury on March 24 after a roughly 40 bps move from late February. For rate-cycle work, this is a paused-easing signal: labor weakness can argue for cuts, but energy-led inflation and Treasury repricing can keep cap-rate compression assumptions flat. See Source: Marcus & Millichap Financial Markets March 2026.

Marcus & Millichap's June 2026 Financial Markets brief turns that policy bind into a tightening-tail scenario. The applied rows preserve the 3.5% Fed Funds lower bound, a 3.8% median year-end 2026 rate projection, 3.6% PCE and 3.3% core PCE projections, and a 4.46% 10-year Treasury as of June 18. For cap-rate work, this means the base case should not rely on near-term policy easing or clear forward guidance; compression needs asset-level NOI growth, debt proceeds, and exit-liquidity evidence even if transaction volume is improving. See Source: Marcus & Millichap Financial Markets June 2026.

Regime implication: The "late price-discovery / early easing" framing in the 2026 Regime Read above may need to shift toward "paused easing" if energy-driven inflation persists. The flat exit cap base case is reinforced. Any cap rate compression thesis requires an even stronger asset-level story. See Source: Inflation Jumps 0.9% in March as Energy Costs Surge.

Houston Industrial Lending Sentiment: A 2025 Capital-Markets Cycle Case Study

At the InterFace Houston Industrial conference (Aug 2025), a panel of lenders described a "pendulum-like" pattern across 2025: optimism entering the year (carried from Q4 2024 rate cuts), a stall post-Liberation Day (April 2), and cautious recovery by late summer. Bridge lenders reported a bigger activity uptick than traditional or institutional lenders, favoring shallow-bay and owner-occupied industrial assets as "quality deals." The market was described as "comfortably uncomfortable" (quoting J.P. Morgan's midyear outlook). See Source: Houston Industrial Lender Sentiment Reflects Pendulum Movement in 2025.

Office Leasing Volume Recovery: Q1 2026 Transaction Signal

Connect CRE's April 9 report attributes estimated Q1 2026 U.S. office new leasing of 120M SF, up 25% year over year, to preliminary CoStar data. It describes transaction-count-led volume rather than a resurgence of large deals. Interpretation: this is a gross leasing-activity checkpoint, not investment-sales liquidity or evidence of adjusted effective rents, cap-rate compression, or an easing regime. The article provides no rent, cap-rate, interest-rate, vacancy, or absorption series to test those relationships. Preserve its preliminary period and compare separate rate, valuation, lease and occupancy evidence. See Source: U.S. Office Leasing Has Its Best Quarter in Nearly Eight Years.

March 2026 Employment Mix: Narrow Growth, White-Collar Contraction

The BLS March 2026 report showed non-farm payrolls up 178,000 with unemployment steady at 4.3% (22 consecutive months). However, growth was heavily concentrated in healthcare, dining, construction, and courier services. Outside those four sectors, job additions totaled only ~34,000, while information and financial activities dropped 18,000 and professional/business services added just 2,000. Marcus & Millichap notes the low unemployment rate is driven more by declining labor force (lower net migration) than by increased hiring. For the rate-cycle framework, this is a mixed signal: the headline number supports the "no recession" case that keeps spread compression plausible, but the sectoral weakness in office-using industries limits the demand-side argument for office cap rate compression. See Source: The Current Job Numbers and Their Real Estate Impacts.

Treasury Basis Trade Unwind: A Structural Fragility Signal (April 2026)

Joe Palmisano (Connect Money, April 8, 2026) identifies that Treasury market volatility in April 2026 is structurally different from prior rate-volatility episodes. The mechanism: hedge funds running 20–50x leveraged Treasury futures basis trades (long cash Treasury, short futures) are trapped in a self-reinforcing feedback loop. As cash Treasury prices fall and volatility rises, collateral shrinks, forcing delevering by selling the same bonds backing the borrowing — which further depresses prices, further shrinks collateral, and forces more selling. The market has shifted from "orderly repricing" to a "more fragile phase."

The CRE transmission is direct:

1. Treasury volatility → discount-rate uncertainty: CRE cap rates are benchmarked to Treasury yields. When Treasury markets are in a fragile phase driven by mechanical selling rather than fundamental repricing, buyers widen exit cap assumptions and sellers balk. Transaction volume contracts.
2. Mechanically-driven spike ≠ fundamental rate reassessment: This is the key analytical distinction. A basis-trade-driven rate spike may correct faster than a fundamentally driven repricing. For CRE underwriting, the impact on terminal cap rate assumptions should be discounted relative to the spot rate — but timing that discount requires confidence in when the basis trade unwind resolves.
3. Short-term DSCR pressure: Even if the basis trade spike is transitory, it raises financing costs for variable-rate borrowers and makes new construction financing (already stressed by tariff-driven cost escalation) harder to pencil until it unwinds.

This mechanism explains why the April 2026 rate volatility context feels different from the gradual repricing of 2022–2023. Two distinct transmission channels — the March 2026 CPI shock (tariff-driven, 3.3% YoY) and the April 2026 basis trade fragility — are producing similar stress on CRE financing through fundamentally different mechanisms. See Source: Why Rates Volatility Feels Different This Time.

CMBS Delinquencies Rising Across Property Types (March 2026)

The Trepp CMBS Delinquency Rate rose 41bps to 7.55% in March 2026, reversing February's monthly decline. Four of five major property types saw increases. Lodging led at +137bps to 7.31%. New delinquencies: ~$5.1B total, five largest loans = ~$2B. The February improvement was seasonal noise; the structural delinquency trend in CMBS remains upward. See Source: CMBS Delinquencies Reverse Monthly Decline, Rise in March 2026.

AFIRE: Global Capital Still Views U.S. CRE as Safe Haven (April 2026)

AFIRE CEO Gunnar Branson confirmed in April 2026 that global investors continue to view U.S. CRE as the world's safest real estate investment, despite domestic tariff escalation, Treasury basis trade volatility, and CPI acceleration. AFIRE represents foreign investors with approximately $3 trillion in U.S. real estate exposure. Branson's framing: "I don't think a lot of people realize how global our industry has become." For the rate-cycle framework, counter-cyclical foreign capital is a structural floor mechanism — when domestic institutional capital pauses on rate volatility, foreign capital maintains pricing at the top of the quality stack. See Source: AFIRE's Gunnar Branson: U.S. CRE Continues to Be Seen as Safest Investment and Conviction Theme Investing.

Provenance

This page originated in the legacy industrial strategy material and has been rewritten into a cross-asset strategy node. The durable cycle framework comes from the legacy source; the current regime framing was refreshed using Macro Regime Verification 2026-04-09.

April 2026 PPI reinforced the same rate-cycle risk: secondary ConnectCRE coverage reported final-demand PPI up 1.4% month over month and 6.0% year over year. Use the source as macro-regime support, not as a substitute for the primary BLS release. See Source: Producer Prices Jump 6% Annually, Reinforcing Inflation Concerns.