Structuring & tax
Equity Waterfall and Promote Structures
Equity waterfalls govern the sequential distribution of cash flows between the General Partner (GP/Sponsor) and Limited Partners (LPs/Investors). The signed agreement defines capital return, preferred return, catch-up and promote. The review as of 2026-10-07 distinguishes these mechanics from inherited market assumptions; it does not establish a universal 2026 negotiating standard. See Source: ILPA Waterfall Scope Review 2026.
Also known as: Carried Interest, Equity Waterfall, GP/LP Splits, Promote Structure
Updated
Illustrative Four-Tier Waterfall
The inherited table is a set of working parameters, not observed 2026 institutional standards or an executable waterfall. Define each partner's capital return, cash-flow dates, hurdle calculation and compounding, fees, catch-up and tier transitions before modeling. LP/GP percentages below do not specify how GP invested capital is returned.
| Tier | Hurdle (IRR) | LP Share | GP Share | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | 8% – 10% | 100% | 0% | Preferred Return + Return of Capital. |
| Tier 2 | 10% – 15% | 80% | 20% | First Promote Tier. |
| Tier 3 | 15% – 20% | 70% | 30% | Second Promote Tier. |
| Tier 4 | 20%+ | 50% – 60% | 40% – 50% | Residual "Alpha" Tier. |
Negotiating Levers
1. Preferred Return (The "Pref")
- Provisional negotiation input: The inherited 8%–10% value-add pref range remains a working assumption. This review does not establish 2026 market widening or a required spread to the undated 3.65% SOFR input. Specify the agreement's hurdle and distribution terms, deal risks and dated benchmark conventions before comparison; a preferred-return hurdle is distinct from a quoted debt coupon. See Source: Debt Benchmark Conventions Review 2026.
- Catch-up mechanics: A full catch-up can allocate 100% of eligible cash to the GP until the contractual carry target is reached; a slow catch-up can use a 50/50 split. The agreement defines the base and sequence. These alternatives do not establish a current market preference.
Assumed teaching example: LP capital $1M, GP invested capital $0 (a simplifying assumption, not a commitment recommendation), one-year simple LP pref 8%, total profit $500,000 and GP carry target 20% of profit; no fees, taxes or additional tiers. After the $80,000 pref, a full catch-up directs $20,000 to the GP before the remaining $400,000 splits 80/20. A 50/50 catch-up distributes about $53,333.33, half to each partner, before the remaining $366,666.67 splits 80/20. Both fully cleared scenarios distribute $100,000 to the GP and $1.4M to the LP, including returned LP capital. A slower catch-up changes interim distributions without necessarily lowering final carry. The retained high-precision calculation precedes rounding; this example does not implement the four-tier table or ILPA's separate hard-hurdle recommendation.
Preferred Return Accrual
As of the 2026-10-07 methods review, specify eligible capital balances, contribution/return dates, accrual start and end, rate period, day-count/year fractions, compounding and distribution priorities. Simple pref accrual and a money-weighted IRR hurdle are different tests. Under an explicitly simple, piecewise-constant convention, new pref accrual = sum(eligible capital balance × annual rate × contractual year fraction). The constant equity × rate × years shortcut requires an unchanged eligible base and matching units. Track opening unpaid pref plus new accrual less pref payments and contractual adjustments separately from capital return; accrual is not cash already paid or a guarantee of payment.
Assumed annual-period examples: eligible capital 1,000,000 for Year 1, then 500,000 for Years 2–3 at simple 8%, gives 80,000 + 40,000 + 40,000 = 160,000 accrued pref. Assume Year 1 pref is paid before returning 500,000 capital at that year-end; remaining pref is paid in Years 2–3. Holding the original million constant incorrectly gives 240,000. Separately, unchanged capital 1,000,000, no interim pref payments and annual compounding for three years at 8% produces 259,712 pref versus 240,000 simple accrual. An assumed half-year fraction on 2,000,000 at annual 8% gives 80,000, not the full-year 160,000. These are distinct hypothetical agreements, not observed returns or a prescribed day-count rule.
ILPA's 2019 guidance recommends transparent, consistent accrual methodology and attention to capital-at-risk timing (printed p. 10); it does not prescribe this simple ledger for every CRE JV. Confirm subscription-line, fee, recycling and recallable-distribution terms separately. See Source: ILPA Waterfall Scope Review 2026.
Catch-Up Allocation
Specify eligible profit, carry target, GP tranche share, prior allocations and cash available. A full GP catch-up, a shared slow catch-up and a hard-hurdle structure are different contractual choices. Do not apply one catch-up formula to every tier or include returned principal in the profit target by default.
For the existing simplified example only, let H be LP profit already paid as pref, p the target GP share of eligible profit, g the GP share of the next catch-up tranche, and C its required total cash; assume prior GP carry zero and no other tiers/costs. Solving gC = p(H+C) gives C = pH/(g−p) when H>0 and 0<p<g≤1. With H=80,000 and p=20%, g=100% gives C=20,000; g=50% gives C=53,333.333… split equally. If only 10,000 is available after pref, neither case clears the target: GP receives 10,000 versus 5,000 respectively, and the residual split cannot simply begin as though catch-up were complete. For H>0, p>0 and g≤p, this simplified tranche cannot reach the target with finite positive cash. Agreements may define different targets/bases; ILPA's hard-hurdle recommendation is not a mandate for this example.
2. The "Double-Hurdle" (IRR and EMx)
An agreement can require both an IRR and an equity multiple (EMx) hurdle before the next promote tier. IRR depends on dated cash flows; EMx measures distributions relative to contributed capital under a specified convention. A dual test can constrain early promote eligibility, but does not guarantee profit or prudent exit timing. No prevalence claim is established here.
3. GP Co-Invest & "Skin in the Game"
ILPA Principles 3.0 (June 2019, p. 17) recommends a substantial GP equity interest funded in cash rather than through management-fee waivers or specialized financing. It does not prescribe a universal percentage. Inherited 10%–15% and 1%–5% co-invest ranges are negotiation scenarios pending agreement-specific support; they do not establish a strict 2026 rule or a top-decile sponsor exception.
Promote Tier Share and Total Distributions
Only for an assumed residual profit tier that first allocates a promote share p solely to the GP and then divides the remainder by GP ownership o, the GP share of that tier is p + o(1−p). It is not automatically a share of all deal distributions or a contractual entitlement in other waterfalls.
Assume LP capital 900,000, GP capital 100,000, both returned in full; eligible residual profit 500,000; GP promote 20% and ownership 10%, with no pref, catch-up, fees, taxes or other tiers. GP profit share is 28%, or 140,000; LP profit is 360,000. Including returned capital, GP receives 240,000 and LP 1,260,000, totaling 1,500,000. GP thus receives 16% of total distributions, not 28%. This separate teaching example does not implement either four-tier table or the LP-only catch-up example.
Structural Varieties
American vs. European Waterfalls (2026 Context)
- American (deal-by-deal): Carry may become payable on realized investments before all fund-level outcomes are known. Specify loss, expense, clawback and security provisions. This review does not establish Texas dominance or mandatory 20%–30% escrow. ILPA's 2019 guidance (p. 10) gives a carry escrow example of 30% of carry distributions or more, with additional reserves for potential clawback; it is a recommendation, not a universal legal requirement.
- European (whole-fund): Carry eligibility is evaluated across the fund. ILPA recommends an all-contributions-plus-preferred-return-back-first approach (p. 10); the signed agreement determines the actual mechanics. This recommendation does not establish growing 2026 market dominance.
ILPA primarily addresses private-equity partnerships and asks readers to consider terms separately and holistically (p. 6). Apply relevant principles to a CRE JV with explicit scope rather than treating fund terminology as proof of its contract.
GP Fee Structures
The fee stack has been split into a separate reusable node: GP Fee Structures.
Keep this page focused on promote tiers, hurdle logic, catch-up, and clawback. Use Office Equity Waterfall and Promote Structures for office-specific hold-period mechanics and worked examples.
Related Pages
- CRE Return Metrics and KPIs
- CRE Capital Stack and Debt Structuring
- GP Fee Structures
- Office Equity Waterfall and Promote Structures
- Professional CRE Investment Frameworks
- Texas CRE Debt Capital Markets 2026
- Texas Trophy Office Flight to Quality
- Texas Underwriting in the 2026 Macro Regime
Sources
- Legacy Industrial Knowledge Wiki
- 2026 Q2 Market Research Sprint
- Source: ILPA Waterfall Scope Review 2026 — primary 2019 guidance and explicitly assumed arithmetic; the inherited Chatham/PropertyMetrics attribution has no exact supporting record in this review.