What do broker opinions of value (BOVs) and adjacent valuation marks imply about collateral value as a percentage of loan balance, by loan vintage, time period, and asset class?

There is no broad public dataset that cleanly reports BOV / current loan balance by loan vintage and asset class. The evidence is fragmented. Loan-level articles occasionally disclose a BOV and current balance, while broader public research usually reports updated appraised-value declines, appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs), delinquency rates, special-servicing rates, maturity outcomes, or rating-agency stressed values.

Even with that limitation, the directional answer is clear: BOVs and adjacent valuation marks are most useful as a distress-severity map, not as a market-wide valuation index. They imply the lowest current collateral coverage in 2017-2018 office, weak regional retail, and selected mixed-use assets; more bifurcated coverage in private-label / transitional multifamily and lodging; and generally stronger coverage in industrial except where leverage, floating-rate structure, or functional obsolescence dominates.

The time-series read is also clear. Public distress marks moved from a pandemic-era hotel and retail stress lane in 2020-2022 toward an office-heavy and maturity-driven stress regime in 2023-2026. By the 2025 reappraisal cohort, the clearest vintage signal was 2017-2018 office: Trepp reported median value declines of 71% for 2017 office and 67% for 2018 office, which translate to roughly 41% to 51% of loan balance under a 65% to 70% original-LTV assumption before expenses and exposure adjustments.

The EDGAR seed panel adds one substantive recovery conclusion: value marks can materially overstate eventual trust recovery. The extractor found 151 raw monthly liquidation table rows, which dedupe to 14 unique resolved-loan cases across 5 issuers. In those 14 deduped cases, median most-recent value/BPO was about 99% of beginning scheduled balance, but median distributable proceeds were about 74%. Seven cases distributed less than 80% of balance, and two cases with value marks at or above par still distributed below par after costs. In the three labeled office liquidation cases, value/BPO ranged from about 27% to 49% of balance and distributable proceeds ranged from about 9% to 36%. That is a small selected sample, but it is consistent with the broader office impairment thesis.

The active special-servicing rows add a different caution: special servicing is not automatically principal impairment. Some latest-per-loan special-servicing rows still show appraisal coverage above principal balance, and some component rows appear to use whole-collateral appraisals against component balances. Those rows confirm that valuation marks exist in public remittance material, but they are not clean enough to infer asset-class averages until valuation scope is normalized.

The usable answer is therefore a hierarchy, not a single time series:

1. Direct BOV/current-balance marks exist but are sparse. Santa Monica Place is the cleanest public example: a $264.5 million September 2022 BOV against a $300 million loan, or about 88% of current loan balance.
2. Updated appraisals are the best public proxy. The 2025 Trepp reappraisal cohort cleared at a median 53% discount to origination; if the original loan was 65% to 70% LTV and mostly interest-only, that implies a rough current value of 67% to 72% of loan balance for the median reappraised loan before exposure adjustments.
3. The worst vintage signal is 2017-2018 office. Trepp's 2025 cohort reported median office value declines of 71% for 2017 vintage and 67% for 2018 vintage. At a 65% to 70% original LTV assumption, those translate to only 41% to 51% of loan balance before fees, advances, and liquidation costs.
4. Retail mall and mixed-use collateral can screen as severely impaired even outside office. KBRA's distressed-loan appraisal study showed retail down 52.8% and mixed-use down 49.2% from origination, worse than office's 44.6% in that sample.
5. Liquidation expenses and advances are central to the answer. The EDGAR seed panel shows that value / balance and distributable proceeds / balance can diverge sharply. Value marks and recoveries should not be collapsed into one ratio.
6. Special servicing is a selection flag, not a value mark. Some transfers are maturity, nonmonetary, litigation, borrower, or structure problems rather than simple value-below-balance problems.
7. Industrial is the cleanest major asset-class read, but not risk-free. Current public distress rates are low for industrial, yet rating-agency stressed values can still sit far below issuance appraisals when leverage, floating-rate debt, or valuation methodology changes dominate the read.

The practical interpretation is that "BOV as percent of loan balance" should be treated as collateral coverage pressure, not as a realized recovery forecast. A BOV below 100% means the principal balance is not fully covered by the broker's indicated sale price. It does not automatically mean the trust will take that loss, because resolution can include extension, discounted payoff, note sale, foreclosure, REO sale, borrower equity injection, reserve application, or later market recovery. Conversely, a BOV above 100% does not guarantee full recovery because total trust exposure can exceed principal balance.

This is the user's target metric. It answers: "If a broker's current value opinion were realized as sale proceeds before costs, what percentage of the loan principal would it cover?"

This is the closest widely observable substitute. In public CMBS reporting, updated appraisals are more commonly disclosed than BOVs.

This is the inverse of the coverage ratio. A value/balance ratio of 80% equals an implied current LTV of 125%.

When a source reports only a value decline from origination, the rough translation is:

This is only an approximation. It works best for interest-only loans where current balance is close to original balance. It overstates coverage if total exposure includes advances, default interest, fees, unpaid taxes, insurance, legal costs, or liquidation fees. It understates coverage if the loan amortized materially.

ARA is not a BOV. It is a CMBS waterfall and advancing mechanism. But it is still useful as a distress proxy because the ARA calculation is tied to most recent collateral value. In simplified form:

If current principal balance approximates exposure and reserves are ignored:

That rough math turns a 70% ARA into an implied value/balance of about 33%. It should not be read as a final loss forecast.

The following examples are the closest public evidence to the target metric. They mix direct BOVs, updated appraisals, CRED iQ base-case values, and rating-agency values. The "ratio" column is calculated as value divided by current or stated principal balance unless otherwise noted.

The table shows why this metric is analytically useful: it separates assets still covered on a principal-balance basis from assets where the current value mark is below par. It also shows why it is dangerous to use one source type mechanically. Santa Monica Place had an 88% BOV/current-balance ratio but a 130% appraisal/current-balance ratio. The Branson at Fifth moved from late-2019 BOV coverage near 72% of balance to a December 2020 as-is appraisal near 52% of balance.

The resolved-loan backtests sharpen the denominator problem. 1740 Broadway's as-is appraisal and gross sale proceeds were close to each other, but net proceeds after liquidation expenses were materially lower. Newington Commons and Canyon Crossing looked covered or nearly covered on latest-value basis, yet still resolved with losses after sale discounts and expenses. That means the real dataset needs both value / principal balance and net recovery / total exposure, not one blended coverage number.

The newer resolved-loan examples reinforce that denominator problem. States Addition Apartments, Deer Springs Town Center, and Pavilions at Hartman Heritage all show appraised value or sale proceeds that look materially better than final distributable recovery. Golden East Crossing and Bella of Baton Rouge show the opposite edge case: when the value mark is already deeply below balance, liquidation expenses can push recovery toward land-value or near-wipeout levels.

The public sources mix three different vintage concepts:

1. Origination or securitization vintage: the loan's original issue year, such as 2017 CMBS office.
2. Reappraisal vintage: the year an updated appraisal or BOV is obtained, such as the 2025 reappraisal cohort.
3. Maturity vintage: the year the loan has to repay or refinance, such as 2026 hard maturities.

For BOV/current-balance work, origination vintage is usually the most important because it ties directly to original LTV, underwriting assumptions, interest-rate regime, and peak-cycle values. Reappraisal vintage tells when the market mark was forced. Maturity vintage tells when refinance failure makes the old value basis economically binding.

The time-series direction is clear even though the exact BOV/current-balance panel is missing. The broad public signal moved from pandemic-era hotel and retail stress in 2020-2022 into a more office-heavy and maturity-driven stress regime in 2023-2026. By the 2025 reappraisal cohort, the deepest vintage-specific damage appears in 2017-2018 office collateral.

The April 2026 updates did not reverse the thesis. They make it more precise: delinquency was roughly flat overall, multifamily worsened, office stayed high, special servicing rose, and hard maturities were mostly still performing in April and May. That is a refinance-pressure signal, not a current-value panel.

Office is the deepest and most persistent current impairment lane.

Public evidence:

• Trepp's 2025 reappraisal cohort identified 2017 and 2018 office as the most impaired cohorts, with median declines of 71% and 67% from origination.
• CRED iQ's Q3 2023 appraisal sample showed office down 50.3% on average versus origination.
• KBRA's January 2021-May 2024 appraisal study showed office down 44.6% versus origination across its distressed-loan sample.
• CREFC's March 2026 report showed office delinquency at 11.71% and office special servicing at 16.73%.
• CRED iQ's April 2026 top-50 market read showed office as the highest major-property-type distress category at 17.0%.
• The second gap sprint added 2018-office examples that move in different directions: 220 Northwest 8th Avenue resolved at roughly 40% appraisal-to-balance and 29% distributable-to-balance, while Dumbo Heights and 1670 Broadway still screened above securitized-loan balance before total-debt and workout-cost adjustments.
• The public-remittance sprint added direct SEC evidence that at least some public 10-D exhibits carry CREFC-style historical liquidation rows. BMARK 2018-B2's March 2025 exhibit independently supports the 220 Northwest 8th Avenue denominator stack: most recent value / BPO, proceeds, fees / advances / expenses, net proceeds available for distribution, and realized loss.

Approximate coverage logic:

Image chart

Underwriting read:

The office result is not simply "office is down." The deeper conclusion is that office is where original 2017-2018 leverage most obviously collides with lower current utilization, weaker tenant demand for commodity product, higher cap rates, higher tenant-improvement/leasing-commission requirements, and maturity refinancing constraints. A 2017 office loan originally underwritten at 65% to 70% LTV can become effectively 200%+ current LTV if value is down roughly 70% and the loan balance has not amortized.

Still, BOV/current-balance outcomes are highly asset-specific. Federal Center Plaza's updated appraisal was about 129% of its current balance even after a large value decline from contribution. That is a different credit than a weak commodity office asset whose value mark falls to 40%-50% of balance.

Multifamily does not look like office in stabilized agency-eligible product, but securitized multifamily stress is no longer negligible.

Public evidence:

• KBRA's distressed-loan sample showed multifamily down 35.1% from origination.
• CRED iQ's Q3 2023 sample showed multifamily value declines worsening from 22.0% to 33.6%.
• CREFC's March 2026 report showed multifamily delinquency at 7.15% and special servicing at 8.75%.
• CRED iQ's April 2026 top-50-market analysis described visible multifamily stress concentrations, especially in legacy urban cores and 2021-2022 maturity pressure.
• Loan-level CRED iQ examples show distressed multifamily/senior-housing ratios from roughly 72% to 87% of balance in selected cases.
• Trepp loss-report examples now add realized multifamily outcomes rather than only active-distress marks: States Addition Apartments had 80% appraisal coverage and near-par gross proceeds but only about 57% after-expense recovery, while Bella of Baton Rouge had 62% value coverage and roughly 7% after-expense recovery.
• NEMA San Francisco and Parkmerced show the denominator problem in large apartment / student-housing capital stacks. Senior or CMBS pieces can screen near covered, while total debt including mezzanine is materially less covered.
• Morningstar DBRS's A10 2019-B surveillance provides a bridge-loan example where 46-48 Lispenard's March 2023 appraisal was above the trust loan but below total exposure.
• Morningstar DBRS's SBALR 2020-RR1 surveillance shows the workforce-housing version of the gap: June and August 2023 BOVs for defaulted Emerald Bronx Multifamily Portfolio loans were publicly reported in remittance data, but the available public report provides aggregate BOV decline and projected loss severity rather than a loan-level BOV/current-balance panel.

Approximate coverage logic:

Underwriting read:

The broad multifamily sector has a stronger liquidity floor than office because agency debt remains a major permanent-financing channel. But the CMBS/CRE CLO/SASB subset can be meaningfully weaker than the agency-eligible stabilized universe. The highest-risk vintages are typically 2021-2022 transitional or floating-rate capital stacks, lease-up assets, and properties whose refinance proceeds were underwritten to peak rents, cheap debt, and cap-rate compression.

The right conclusion is not "multifamily is broken." It is that multifamily BOV/current-balance ratios are likely to bifurcate between agency-eligible stabilized assets that still refinance and transitional loans where current value may no longer cover the old basis.

Retail has the broadest internal split. Enclosed malls and weak boxes can show severe collateral impairment; necessity and grocery-anchored retail can still screen as resilient.

Public evidence:

• KBRA's distressed-loan sample showed retail down 52.8% from origination, the weakest major asset class in its study.
• CRED iQ's H1 2023 sample showed retail down 57.0%.
• CRED iQ's Q3 2023 sample showed retail down 51.7%.
• CRED iQ's June 2022 ARA report showed regional mall ARAs of 38% to 82% of outstanding balance across named examples.
• CREFC's March 2026 report showed retail delinquency at 6.62% but retail special servicing at 12.99%, which is still elevated.
• Trepp loss-report extracts add resolved retail backtests: Centralia Outlets resolved through a DPO with value/net recovery around 76% of balance, Canyon Crossing had an appraisal above balance but a much lower net recovery after expenses, and Kitsap Mall resolved near one-third of balance after expenses.
• The later public sprint expanded that backtest set with Pavilions at Hartman Heritage, Deer Springs Town Center, Golden East Crossing, Brunswick Square, and KBRA's Waterfront at Port Chester. Those cases are especially useful because they show all three failure modes: value already below par, value near par but expenses creating loss, and rating-agency liquidation value far below appraisal.

ARA translation for named retail examples:

Underwriting read:

Retail's worst collateral can look as impaired as office or worse, but the asset-class label is too blunt. A weak regional mall with anchor vacancies, co-tenancy issues, high CapEx needs, and limited alternative-use demand belongs in a different bucket from a grocery-anchored or high-income open-air center. BOV/current-balance analysis should therefore split retail into at least four lanes: enclosed regional mall, power / big-box, grocery-anchored necessity, and high-street / mixed-use retail.

Industrial has the cleanest current public distress read among major asset classes, but that does not make every industrial loan safe.

Public evidence:

• CREFC's March 2026 report showed industrial distress near de minimis levels, around 0.65%.
• CRED iQ's top-50-market April 2026 read showed industrial distress at 1.9%.
• CRED iQ's February 2026 CBSA ranking article described industrial CMBS distress averaging just 2.4% across tracked CBSAs, with exceptions tied to specific markets and older functional-obsolescence cases.
• CRED iQ's Q3 2023 appraisal sample showed industrial value declines worsening to 32.0%, though the distressed sample is small and selected.
• Morningstar DBRS's BX 2022-MVRK case shows that a rating-agency value can be far below issuance appraisal even for a mostly occupied industrial portfolio, especially when methodology, leverage, and floating-rate debt matter.
• Trepp loss-report extracts add two industrial-adjacent outcome cases. Taurus Pool / Shelton Technology Center supplies a rare flex-industrial appraisal/proceeds/expense backtest, while Central / Eastern Industrial Pool confirms a large industrial resolution loss but still lacks a public value numerator.

Approximate coverage logic:

Underwriting read:

Industrial BOV/current-balance ratios should normally be stronger than office, retail mall, or hotel distress ratios, because fundamentals and refinancing liquidity are better. The exceptions are loans originated or recapitalized at very high values, floating-rate SASB structures, older warehouses with functional obsolescence, or assets whose rent-growth thesis was capitalized too aggressively.

Lodging was the pandemic-era stress center and remains episodic. Individual loan-level ratios can be very weak, but the broad 2024 appraisal sample is less impaired than office or retail.

Public evidence:

• Trepp's valuation community-call slides showed lodging appraisal reductions around 28% in the distressed sample referenced.
• KBRA's January 2021-May 2024 distressed-loan sample showed lodging down 27.9%.
• CREFC's March 2026 report showed hotel delinquency at 7.31% and hotel special servicing at 9.58%.
• CRED iQ hotel examples show value/balance ratios ranging from about 42% to about 70% for selected distressed properties.
• Morningstar DBRS's HMH Trust 2017-NSS case shows why trust-loan coverage and total-exposure coverage differ: the August 2023 appraisal was about 88% of the trust loan but only about 77% of then-current total exposure.

Approximate coverage logic:

Underwriting read:

Hotel BOV/current-balance analysis needs a more operational lens than office or industrial. Occupancy, ADR, RevPAR recovery, brand, PIP requirements, labor costs, insurance, ground leases, and seasonality can all overwhelm a static value mark. Lodging can recover faster than office when travel demand returns, but the cash-flow volatility and CapEx burden can also make total exposure grow quickly while workouts drag.

Mixed-use is not a single asset class. It is a container for component-level risk.

Public evidence:

• KBRA's distressed-loan sample showed mixed-use down 49.2% from origination.
• CRED iQ's April 2026 top-50-market distress analysis showed mixed-use at 14.6%, behind office but above most other categories.
• The Branson at Fifth shows why component-level analysis matters: as-is appraisal around 52% of balance, stabilized appraisal around 58%, and earlier BOVs around 72%.

Underwriting read:

Mixed-use BOV/current-balance ratios are only as good as the weakest value-driving component. A Manhattan mixed-use building whose retail tenant vacated behaves differently from an apartment-led mixed-use asset with modest ground-floor retail. The BOV should be decomposed into retail, office, multifamily, parking, signage, land, and conversion value where applicable.

If the BOV is 80% of balance, a clean refinance at par is unlikely unless the borrower contributes new equity, the lender accepts a paydown, or another capital source underwrites value differently. But the loan might still avoid a principal loss through extension, improved NOI, sponsor contribution, sale above BOV, or discounted payoff economics that beat liquidation.

For defaulted CMBS, total exposure can include advances, default interest, unpaid taxes, insurance, property-protection advances, legal costs, special-servicing fees, liquidation fees, and other trust expenses. HMH Trust 2017-NSS is the clean example: appraisal coverage looked materially better against trust principal than against total exposure.

2017-2018 office collateral was not necessarily "bad" at origination. The problem is that a 10-year or near-10-year refinancing event is arriving after a structural demand reset, higher base rates, higher lender spreads, higher CapEx requirements, lower market liquidity, and lower proceeds. That is how a conventional 65%-70% original LTV loan can become uncovered.

The broad ranking is useful:

1. office and retail mall collateral show the deepest public impairment signals
2. mixed-use depends on component mix
3. lodging is volatile and operationally path-dependent
4. transitional multifamily is a watch item, not the same as stabilized agency multifamily
5. industrial is generally strongest but still has loan-structure exceptions

But asset subtype matters more than the label. Commodity suburban office, trophy office, enclosed mall, grocery-anchored retail, student housing, senior housing, select-service lodging, leasehold hotel, modern logistics, and old warehouse are different risk buckets.

When a BOV is far below an appraisal, the broker may be closer to current executable-sale psychology, or the BOV may be a conservative workout input. When an appraisal is far below a BOV, the appraisal may be using a different premise, date, or income assumption. Treat the gap itself as information about liquidity, bid depth, and market confidence.

For quick screening of distressed CMBS loans:

These are not universal investment rules. They are triage bands for converting BOVs and appraisal marks into a credit-workout question.

• No public source found a comprehensive BOV/current-balance panel by loan vintage, quarter, and property type.
• Public BOV examples are usually individual loan writeups, not clean datasets.
• Updated appraisals are selected toward loans already in or near distress.
• ARA is useful but can be misleading if read as a realized-loss estimate.
• SEC 10-D exhibit tables can disclose appraisal/BPO, balance, gross proceeds, expenses, net recovery, and realized loss together, but the output is not normalized across trusts.
• The expanded EDGAR extraction demonstrates the parser path across multiple trusts, but the seed panel is still too small and selected to infer asset-class distributions.
• Some special-servicing valuation rows appear to use whole-collateral appraisals against component balances, so raw ratios need valuation-scope flags before aggregation.
• Industrial direct BOV/current-balance examples are thin because there are fewer distressed public cases.
• Multifamily evidence must be split between private-label CMBS, SASB, CRE CLO, transitional bridge exposure, and agency-eligible stabilized assets.
• Public evidence now confirms BOVs are created in special-servicer workflows, but those BOV files are not normally released as a normalized public dataset.
• Rating-agency reports can disclose pool-level BOV/appraisal-to-current-loan logic, but that is not the same as loan-level distressed BOV/current-balance disclosure.

• May 2026 CMBS delinquency and special-servicing updates when the full monthly reports are available, especially multifamily and office.
• More 2017-2018 office appraisals and realized sale outcomes as those loans move through maturity.
• Loan-level BOV disclosures in modification templates, receiver-sale packages, and special-servicer commentary.
• Whether retail mall ARAs keep resolving through actual sales, DPOs, or returned-to-master-servicer modifications.
• Whether 2021-2022 multifamily bridge and CRE CLO loans produce appraisal/current-balance marks below 80%.
• Whether industrial SASB refinancing failures remain isolated or broaden as floating-rate loans reset.
• Whether future access to agency loan-performance exports can cleanly benchmark stabilized multifamily credit behavior without mixing it into CMBS workout valuation cohorts.
• Expand the SEC public-remittance sample beyond the first seed panel and join ABS-EE Schedule AL XML / prospectus fields to 10-D Exhibit 99.1 liquidation tables so every resolved-loan row has asset class, vintage, origination value, current balance, and valuation source.
• For a broader panel, register for Computershare / CTSLink first, then evaluate Trepp or CRED iQ data-feed access if trustee-portal coverage is too fragmented.

The public record is enough to define the model and build a seed panel, but not enough to fill a complete normalized panel. A serious paid-data or servicer-file build should use the following structure.

The data-build path is no longer "find the right public report." It is "assemble a public-remittance, servicer-file, or paid-data panel." Fitch's Torchlight servicer report is the clearest public workflow clue: within 90 days of a transfer to special servicing or REO conversion, the servicer obtains an updated appraisal and at least one BOV. Those value marks exist operationally, but public articles usually expose them only when a loan becomes newsworthy, a rating agency cites it, or a remittance/loss report includes enough fields to infer the ratio.

There is a practical no-account path for a targeted public sample:

1. Use SEC company submissions to identify the issuer CIK and monthly 10-D / ABS-EE filings for a trust.
2. Use ABS-EE Schedule AL XML for repeatable loan/property fields: current scheduled or actual balance, property type, origination/securitization date, original valuation, most recent valuation amount/date/source when populated, special-servicing dates, advances, and realized loss fields.
3. Use the 10-D Exhibit 99.1 distribution report when available for the richer CREFC-style tables. In BMARK 2018-B2's March 2025 filing, the exhibit's "Historical Liquidated Loan Detail" table included the exact fields needed for a resolved-loan backtest: beginning scheduled balance, most recent appraised value or BPO, proceeds, fees / advances / expenses, net proceeds received, net proceeds available for distribution, realized loss, and loss percentage.
4. Join the public 10-D exhibit rows back to ABS-EE and prospectus records by prospectus ID / loan number, then normalize field names across deal administrators.
5. Classify rows by valuation source where disclosed. CREFC IRP distinguishes most recent valuation amount, valuation date, and valuation source; CREFC modification templates also contemplate appraisal and BOV collateral-valuation fields.

The first local implementation is scripts/extract_sec_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel.py, with per-trust outputs under raw/extracts/2026/2026-05-28-sec-edgar-cmbs-remittance-bov-panel*/ and compact CSV copies under data/sec_edgar_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel/. The combined panel is built by scripts/aggregate_sec_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel.py.

Current combined outputs:

• data/sec_edgar_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel/combined_liquidated_loan_latest_by_loan.csv
• data/sec_edgar_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel/combined_specially_serviced_loan_rows.csv
• data/sec_edgar_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel/combined_specially_serviced_loan_detail_rows.csv
• data/sec_edgar_cmbs_remittance_bov_panel/combined_summary.json

As of the 2026-05-28 pull, the raw derived packages contain 151 monthly liquidation table rows. The combined liquidation table dedupes those repeated monthly rows to 14 unique resolved-loan cases across 5 issuers. The special-servicing valuation table has 1,186 row-months across 9 issuers: office 445, lodging 299, retail 183, various 101, mixed-use 96, multifamily 58, other 3, and industrial 1. Treat those counts as a seed-panel inventory, not statistically meaningful asset-class averages.

The seed panel changes the dataset plan in three ways:

1. The public remittance path works. EDGAR can expose the numerator, denominator, proceeds, expense, and realized-loss fields for specific trusts and months.
2. Resolved-loan output needs two denominator families. The seed liquidation rows show meaningful spread between value/BPO coverage and distributable-proceeds coverage, so the dataset should keep principal-balance coverage and total-exposure/net-recovery coverage separate.
3. Active special-servicing ratios require scope controls. Pari passu, component, and portfolio loans can share a whole-collateral appraisal value. Those rows show that valuation marks are present, but they are not directly comparable to single-loan liquidation rows until valuation scope is normalized.

This is enough to build a small public panel around known resolved loans and active special-servicing valuation marks. It is not enough for a broad clean time series without substantial parsing and reconciliation work.

No account is needed for SEC EDGAR, public KBRA press releases, public Morningstar DBRS press releases, public Trepp articles, or public CRED iQ articles. Accounts or subscriptions become necessary when the research goal shifts from "targeted public sample" to "complete repeatable panel."

The most useful cuts are:

• origination vintage by year: 2012, 2013, 2014, etc.
• vintage cohort: pre-2015, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2019, 2020, 2021-2022, 2023+
• asset class and subtype
• appraisal or BOV quarter
• maturity year
• loan status at valuation date
• geography and market tier
• fixed-rate versus floating-rate
• conduit versus SASB versus CRE CLO

Do not average raw ratios without controlling for selection. BOVs and updated appraisals are more likely to be ordered when something is wrong. A "BOV time series" built only from special-serviced loans is a stress-cohort time series, not a market-wide valuation index.

Minimum controls:

• separate special-serviced loans from performing loans
• separate maturity defaults from payment defaults
• winsorize extreme ratios or report medians and quartiles
• flag appraisal vintage versus origination vintage
• show both principal-balance coverage and total-exposure coverage
• split retail malls from necessity retail and office trophy from commodity office
• keep agency multifamily performance cohorts separate from private-label CMBS, SASB, CRE CLO, and bridge-loan valuation cohorts
• separate appraisal/BOV marks from final realized loss

• Source Stack: BOV and CMBS Value-to-Loan-Balance Research 2026
• Source Collection: Trepp Research & Insights Public Crawl 2026
• Source: Special Servicing Rate Rises to 11% in March
• Source: CMBS Delinquencies Reverse Monthly Decline, Rise in March 2026
• Source: CMBS Delinquencies Inch Downward in April 2026

• CMBS and Commercial Mortgage Securitization
• CMBS and Special Servicing Stress Q1 2026
• CRE Credit Stress Snapshot Q1 2026
• Distressed Office Price Discovery 2026
• CRE Valuation Methodologies
• Office Disposition and Exit Strategy
• Distressed Asset Underwriting
• CRE Capital Stack and Debt Structuring
• Analyses Hub